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931 
ICANN’S ESCAPE FROM ANTITRUST LIABILITY 
The power to control the architecture of the Internet is the power to 
control communication, commerce, and vast quantities of personal data. 
That power is wielded primarily by an American non-profit organization 
called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN). Although one of ICANN’s professed purposes is to promote 
competition in the markets for domain names and domain name services,
1
 
it has failed to do so effectively.
2
 On the contrary, many of ICANN’s 
actions have harmed competition.
3
 
This Note will examine ICANN’s conduct through the lens of 
American antitrust law and evaluate why ICANN has largely escaped 
antitrust liability. Part I describes the technical background of the Domain 
Name System (DNS), the role that ICANN plays in the administration and 
governance of the DNS, and the basic principles of antitrust law that 
regulate the domain name marketplace. Part II details the antitrust 
allegations against ICANN and explains how ICANN’s actions may be 
anticompetitive. ICANN has used its unilateral control over the DNS to 
restrict competitive bidding, influence prices, and maintain entry barriers 
in the domain name marketplace. Part III explains why ICANN’s conduct 
has received little antitrust scrutiny. ICANN’s unusual and complex 
decision-making process and its close relationship with the United States 
government each contribute to the reluctance of courts and antitrust 
enforcement authorities to examine ICANN’s conduct. Unless ICANN 
receives closer attention, all participants in the domain name marketplace, 
from businesses to consumers, will continue to pay higher prices, and 
innovation will continue to be stifled. 
I. DOMAIN NAMES AND THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
The Domain Name System, or DNS, is the organizational backbone of 
the Internet. Without the shorthand of domain names, Internet users would 
be largely unable to communicate, transact, or share information.
4
 This 
 
 
 1. See INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NOS., ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION art. 4 
(1998), available at http://icann.org/en/general/articles.htm [hereinafter ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION] 
(“The Corporation shall operate . . . through open and transparent processes that enable competition 
and open entry in Internet-related markets.”). 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
 4. See Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2003) (“The Internet domain name system (DNS) is an addressing system that greatly facilitates 
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Part describes the DNS and relevant antitrust law. Section A describes the 
technology underlying the DNS and the domain name hierarchy. Section B 
describes ICANN and the role it plays in the administration of the DNS. 
Section C briefly summarizes American antitrust law. 
A. The Domain Name System 
The DNS allows users to easily navigate the Internet.
5
 The Internet is a 
series of interconnected computers that exchange data using uniform 
communications protocols.
6
 The standardized protocols guarantee that 
each computer connected to the Internet can communicate easily with all 
the others.
7
 To facilitate this communication, each connected computer is 
assigned a unique number called an Internet Protocol (IP) address that 
identifies the computer’s virtual location.8 All connected computers have 
these addresses, from a terminal in a public library to smart phones to the 
servers of Google and Microsoft.
9
 
IP addresses are randomly assigned, unwieldy, and difficult to 
remember.
10
 The DNS solves these problems by replacing the numbers 
with a series of alphanumeric characters that typically use common words, 
names, or phrases to refer to the particular computer the user intends to 
access.
11
 Thus, www.google.com stands in for an otherwise obscure 
 
 
Internet communication.”). 
 5. See Lily Blue, Note, Internet and Domain Name Governance: Antitrust Litigation and 
ICANN, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 387, 387 (2004) (observing that domain names aid online 
communication because they make addresses easy to remember). Many commentators have recently 
argued that the importance of the DNS is declining. Now that a large percentage of web browsing 
begins with a search rather than a URL, the prominence of domain names will undoubtedly become 
less important. However, until the time comes when human-friendly email addresses and easily 
memorable domain names are no longer sought after by individuals and firms, the DNS’s “hegemony 
of convenience” will continue. See A. Michael Froomkin, Almost Free: An Analysis of ICANN’s 
‘Affirmation of Commitments,’ 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 187, 224 (2011). 
 6. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849–50 (1997) (“The Internet is an 
international network of interconnected computers.”). 
 7. See Glossary, ICANN.ORG, http://www.icann.org/en/general/glossary.htm (last visited Mar. 
15, 2012) (defining Internet Protocol as “the communications protocol underlying the Internet . . . 
[that] allows large, geographically diverse networks of computers to communicate with each other 
quickly and economically over a variety of physical links”). 
 8. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS 
WORLD 31 (2006); see also FAQs, ICANN.ORG, http://www.icann.org/en/faq (last visited Mar. 15, 
2012) (“Every computer on the Internet has a unique address—just like a telephone number—which is 
a rather complicated string of numbers.”). 
 9. See FAQs, supra note 8.  
 10. See Blue, supra note 5, at 388 (describing IP addresses as “nearly impossible to remember”).  
 11. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 8, at 31 (characterizing domain names as “shorthands for 
the numbers”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining domain names as “any alphanumeric 
designation . . . as part of an electronic address on the Internet”).  
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number.
12
 When an Internet user types a domain name into a web browser, 
a computer called a root server
13
 matches the domain name with its 
corresponding IP address and directs the user’s computer to the target.14  
Domain names are organized in a hierarchical structure.
15
 The familiar 
endings of domain names (the “.com” in www.google.com, for example) 
are called Top-Level Domains (TLDs).
16
 These TLDs are further divided 
into second-level domains (the “google” in www.google.com).17 Internet 
users and businesses can register and obtain a second-level domain name 
within a TLD, but only ICANN is able to create new TLDs.
18
 ICANN’s 
control over whether and how to add new TLDs derives from its authority 
to administer the root servers, the computers that match domain names to 
IP addresses.
19
 Because the root servers contain the information that 
allows Internet users to get where they want to go online,
20
 control of 
those servers grants ICANN nearly plenary power over the DNS.
21
  
Only seven TLDs existed prior to the formation of ICANN in 1998.
22
 
Despite millions of second-level domains being registered in the past 
 
 
 12. On March 15, 2012, the IP address for www.google.com was 72.14.204.103, but the number 
changes frequently. Google.com Who.is Lookup, WHO.IS, http://www.who.is/whois/google.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2012). If typed into a web browser, this number would act identically to the 
alphanumeric code, but it is much more difficult to remember.  
 13. Root servers contain the information that matches IP addresses with domain names. See 
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 8, at 29 (describing the root server as “the master computer for the 
whole Internet”); Glossary, supra note 7. 
 14. See Blue, supra note 5, at 388.  
 15. See id.; see also Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), ICANN.ORG, http://www.icann.org/en/tlds 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (“The DNS forms a tree-like hierarchy.”). 
 16. Glossary, supra note 7. There are two categories of TLDs: generic TLDs and country-code 
TLDs. Generic TLDs are few in number and, for the most part, consist of the most well-known TLDs 
such as .com, .org, and .edu. Country-code TLDs are much more numerous and are typically 
controlled by the nation to which they correspond; for example, the United Kingdom controls .uk, 
Germany controls .de, and so on. See Blue, supra note 5, at 389–90.  
 17. See Blue, supra note 5, at 388–89; Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), supra note 15.  
 18. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 8 (“Whoever controls the root [ICANN] controls 
which, and how many, TLDs will be accessible to the vast majority of Internet users.”). 
 19. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dept. of Commerce and Internet Corp. 
for Assigned Names and Numbers § III.B (Nov. 25, 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/1998/memorandum-understanding-between-us-department-commerce-and-internet-corporat. 
The original Memorandum of Understanding that established the relationship between ICANN and the 
federal government set out the purposes of ICANN. Its policy-development role is intimately bound up 
with its role as technical administrator of the DNS. Id.; see also infra Part III.B.2.  
 20. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 21. See MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF 
CYBERSPACE 47–48 (2002) (observing that the DNS root provides “a single, and therefore globally 
consistent, starting point for the resolution of domain names” and therefore that whoever controls the 
contents of the root zone file controls the network’s uniformity).  
 22. The original TLDs were .com, .edu, .gov, .int, .mil, .net, and .org. See Top-Level Domains 
(gTLDs), supra note 15. 
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decade and considerable consumer demand for additional name space, 
ICANN has added only thirteen new TLDs.
23
 Finally, in 2008, ICANN 
decided to create a program for regularly adding new TLDs to the DNS.
24
 
The new program has only recently been implemented, with applications 
for new TLDs accepted between January and April 2012.
25
  
B. ICANN and Its Registries 
The Internet is older than it seems. The earliest research into the 
technology that would become the Internet was funded by the U.S. 
Department of Defense in the 1960s.
26
 As networks became more complex 
and personal computers became more numerous, the administration of the 
Internet expanded beyond the Defense Department.
27
 In 1990, the National 
Science Foundation took control of the Internet
28
 and quickly awarded the 
first private contract for control of the DNS to a for-profit company called 
Network Solutions, Inc.
29
 Conflicts arose continuously between Network 
Solutions and the technical managers of the DNS—the scientists and 
engineers who had developed and guided the technology for decades.
30
 In 
 
 
 23. In 2000–2001, .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro were added. In 2003, .asia, 
.cat, .jobs, .mobi, .tel, and .travel were added. See Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), supra note 15; see 
also Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 23 (observing the “logjam” that prevented new TLDs from 
joining the DNS); infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 24. ICANN formally approved the New gTLD Program in June 2008. See New Generic Top-
Level Domains Fact Sheet, ICANN.ORG (July 2011), http://archive.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gtld-
facts-31jul11-en.pdf. 
 25. See id. at 1. The rollout of new TLDs has been fraught with delay. The final version of the 
New gTLD Applicant Guidebook was finally published in September 2011, but applications 
themselves were not accepted until January 12, 2012. Id. As of March 19, 2012, 329 applicants had 
registered to apply for new TLDs. See Program Statistics, ICANN.ORG, http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/ 
program-status/statistics (last visited Mar. 23, 2012); see also infra notes 134–37 and accompanying 
text. 
 26. See Christopher M. Bruner, States, Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory 
Regimes in an Era of Economic Globalization, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 125, 149 (2008) (“Today’s 
Internet traces its origins to 1960s-era ‘packet switching’ research funded by the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD).”). 
 27. Interest in the Internet grew among non-defense government agencies as well as in the 
commercial sector. See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY, 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (recounting the development 
of the Internet); see also Bruner, supra note 26, at 153.  
 28. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 153. 
 29. Id. at 153–54; see also Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to 
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 55 (2000) [hereinafter Froomkin, 
Wrong Turn]. 
 30. As the exclusive manager of the DNS, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) made hundreds of 
millions of dollars registering domain names during the 1990s. The engineers resented NSI’s attempts 
to exercise greater control over the DNS, and viewed the firm as “greedy, controlling, and 
monopolistic.” GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 8, at 35–36.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/5
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1998, the U.S. government finally decided to consolidate the 
administration of the DNS in a single organization.
31
 
The Clinton administration issued a statement of policy in June 1998, 
which solicited a private American non-profit corporation to take over 
management of the DNS.
32
 This policy statement became known as the 
DNS White Paper.
33
 Shortly thereafter, a group of scientists led by Dr. Jon 
Postel,
34
 one of the most well-known and respected Internet pioneers, 
created ICANN as a California non-profit organization.
35
 The United 
States quickly recognized ICANN as the organization that it had 
envisioned in the White Paper.
36
 The U.S. Department of Commerce 
(DOC) contracted with ICANN to manage the technical aspects of the 
DNS,
37
 and entrusted it with policy control over the future of the DNS 
pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding.
38
 DOC formally 
relinquished control over DNS policy when the Memorandum expired in 
September 2009, but the U.S. government retains significant control over 
the DNS.
39
 
ICANN performs the central function of DNS management—
registering and assigning domain names—by contracting with third 
parties.
40
 Each of the Internet’s Top-Level Domains (TLDs) is 
administered by a single entity called a registry operator.
41
 Under contract 
with ICANN, these registries operate the authoritative domain name 
 
 
 31. See infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 32. A task force led by Senior Presidential Advisor Ira Magaziner directed the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration at the Department of Commerce to “privatize” 
the DNS. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 8, at 168 (opining that although the U.S. government had 
the authority to control the DNS, “it appeared uninterested in actually administering Internet naming 
and numbering”); Bruner, supra note 26, at 154.  
 33. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10, 1998). 
 34. Dr. Postel single-handedly coordinated the DNS for much of its existence. He was a 
researcher at the Stanford Research Institute and then the University of Southern California, where he 
administered the DNS pursuant to U.S. government contracts. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 8, at 
29, 33–35 (discussing Postel’s unique role in early Internet governance and referring to him as “the 
God of the Internet”).  
 35. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 154. 
 36. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 10. The White Paper did not directly create a 
private corporation, which would have violated the Government Corporation Control Act, but instead 
invited private individuals to form one. See Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 29, at 71. 
 37. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 38. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 19; see also Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 
4, at 13–14 (summarizing the original Memorandum of Understanding). 
 39. See infra Part III.B. 
 40. See Blue, supra note 5, at 389 (noting that ICANN “oversees and governs the registries”). 
 41. See Glossary, supra note 7 (defining “Registry”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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database for their TLD.
42
 For example, the lucrative .com TLD is 
administered by the private company VeriSign, Inc.
43
 All domain names 
ending in .com must be registered with VeriSign.
44
 These registry 
operators, in turn, contract with hundreds of organizations called 
registrars, which market and sell domain names to consumers.
45
 While 
each TLD has only one registry operator, it may have hundreds of 
registrars.
46
 Through its contracts with the registry operators, ICANN is 
able to set the terms for the registration and exchange of domain names 
and thereby exercise significant control over the domain-name 
marketplace.
47
 
C. Antitrust Law 
The U.S. Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 to promote 
consumer welfare and efficiency,
48
 counter the threat of antidemocratic 
political pressures from dominant corporations,
49
 and protect small, 
independent businesses.
50
 Section 1 of the Act makes illegal “[e]very 
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce.”51 Section 1’s prohibition extends to horizontal agreements 
(those among competitors at the same level of the supply chain) and 
 
 
 42. Id.; see also Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 7 (describing the registry database as “the 
authoritative source of information for that TLD”). 
 43. .com Registry Agreement, ICANN.ORG (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.icann.org/en/tlds/ 
agreements/verisign/registry-agmt-com-22sep10.htm.  
 44. See id. § 3.1(d)(iii) (including among the Registry Services that VeriSign agreed to provide 
the maintenance of domain name registration data for .com and the dissemination of information 
“concerning domain name server registrations”). 
 45. See Blue, supra note 5, at 389. Because registrars market directly to consumers, they are 
more well-known to the general public. They include companies such as GoDaddy.com and countless 
others. See ICANN-Accredited Registrars, ICANN.ORG, http://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/ 
accredited-list.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 46. See ICANN-Accredited Registrars, supra note 45. 
 47. See, e.g., .com Registry Agreement, supra note 43, § 7.3(d) (prescribing the maximum price 
VeriSign may charge its registrars for each domain name registration); see also Froomkin, supra note 
5, at 212 (arguing that because of its unique position, ICANN has the power to impose contract terms 
on registrars, determine business models, and alter the structure of the domain name market). 
 48. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 17 (Rev’d 
ed. 1993) (describing the primary goal of antitrust law as “the advancement of consumer welfare”). 
 49. Some scholars argue that the enactment of the Sherman Act had little to do with economic 
efficiency and everything to do with the “fear that excessive concentration of economic power will 
breed antidemocratic political pressures.” Robert Pitosfky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 
428–29 (2d Cir. 1945).  
 50. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427 (“It is possible . . . to prefer a system of small producers, each 
dependent for his success upon his own skill and character . . . .”). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/5
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vertical agreements (those between manufacturers and distributors).
52
 
Most agreements are analyzed under the “Rule of Reason,” a level of 
scrutiny by which a court weighs an agreement’s procompetitive benefits 
against its anticompetitive harms.
53
 Only “naked” restraints such as price 
fixing are considered illegal per se and receive no benefit of the doubt, 
regardless of their effect on competition.
54
 
While Section 1 targets agreements among multiple firms, Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act aims at the anticompetitive conduct of single firms in a 
given market.
55
 “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize” a relevant market is guilty of violating the Act.56 A violation 
of Section 2 has two elements: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in 
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”57 This two-part 
test is meant to distinguish between monopolies that have acquired their 
market power through anticompetitive conduct and monopolies that have 
achieved success through vigorous competition.
58
  
Because the Sherman Act is meant to encourage vigorous competition, 
courts are wary to punish monopolies unless their conduct has damaged 
competition.
59
 The essential antitrust inquiry, therefore, is whether a firm 
has engaged in activity that has harmed competition in a relevant market.
60
 
Part II uses this antitrust analysis to determine whether ICANN’s conduct 
has damaged competition in the domain name market. 
 
 
 52. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 43–44. 
 53. See, e.g., Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (identifying the “standard of 
reason”); see also Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true test 
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”). 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (“[A] 
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or 
stabilizing the price of a commodity . . . is illegal per se.”). 
 55. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 42 (“Antitrust law treats unilateral conduct under 
the law of monopolization. The governing statute is § 2 of the Sherman Act . . . .”). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 57. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).  
 58. See United States v. Alumnium Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (distinguishing firms that 
acquired a monopoly through “superior skill, foresight and industry” from those that wrongfully 
obtained monopoly power).  
 59. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 43 (discussing the distinction between “natural” 
monopolies and harmful, anticompetitive monopolies). 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (defining the 
antitrust abuse of monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
938 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:931 
 
 
 
 
II. ICANN’S ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT 
As the technical manager of the DNS, ICANN has a great deal of 
control over the domain name marketplace.
61
 Some of ICANN’s conduct, 
particularly as it relates to its contracts with registry operators, has harmed 
competition in the domain name market. Part II discusses three examples 
of ICANN’s anticompetitive behavior. Section A describes ICANN’s 
elimination of competitive bidding for registry contracts. Section B 
discusses ICANN’s control over domain name prices in the .com, .net, and 
.org TLDs. Section C addresses ICANN’s constrained rollout of new 
TLDs and the impact of the New gTLD Program.  
A. Competitive Bidding 
“Price is the ‘central nervous system of the economy.’”62 Agreements 
that interfere with the natural ebb and flow of prices are presumptively 
illegal.
63
 Competitive bidding is an important method for ensuring that 
price is controlled by the market.
64
 The Sherman Act does not 
affirmatively require competitive bidding,
65
 but an unfair restriction on 
competitive bidding may restrain trade within the meaning of the Act.
66
 
ICANN has imposed unfair restrictions on competitive bidding and has 
therefore violated the Sherman Act.  
Restrictions on competitive bidding are evaluated under the Rule of 
Reason because they do not restrain competition in the same way as a 
naked restraint like price fixing.
67
 The Supreme Court applied the Rule of 
 
 
 61. See Froomkin, supra note 5, at 212 (“ICANN has used its power to limit the number of new 
TLDs, pick winners (or, some would claim, play favorites), and determine business models and 
domain name market structure (in both pro- and anti-competitive fashions).”). 
 62. Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (quoting United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940)). 
 63. See Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223 (finding that market manipulation “distorts” prices and 
prevents “the determination of those prices by free competition alone”). 
 64. Although the antitrust laws do “not require competitive bidding,” Professional Engineers, 
435 U.S. at 694, “concerted action between co-conspirators to eliminate competitive bidding for a 
contract is an actionable harm to competition.” Coalition for ICANN Transparency v. VeriSign, Inc., 
611 F.3d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc. v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 850 
F.2d 477, 487 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 65. Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 694. 
 66. See id. at 695 (“Petitioner’s ban on competitive bidding . . . must be justified under the Rule 
of Reason. . . .”); see also Cont’l Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 
994 F. Supp. 133, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that once competitive bidding is in place, its 
subversion by the parties is evidence of a conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act); Harkins, 850 F.2d at 
487 (“Concerted action to eliminate competitive bidding violates the Sherman Act.”). 
 67. See Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 693–96 (applying a Rule of Reason analysis to a ban 
on competitive bidding). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/5
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Reason to a ban on competitive bidding in National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States.
68
 A non-profit association of 
engineers banned competitive bidding for its members’ projects.69 The 
Court held that the practice restrained trade within the meaning of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, but as part of the Rule of Reason analysis explored 
the association’s justifications for its ban.70 The association contended that 
ensuring high prices guaranteed the quality of its members’ work.71 The 
Court rejected the association’s argument because it necessarily assumed 
that competition itself is unreasonable—a conclusion inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Sherman Act.
72
 
ICANN has eliminated competitive bidding for DNS registry contracts. 
VeriSign, Inc., the registry operator of the lucrative .com and .net TLDs,
73
 
was the beneficiary of a no-bid contract for operation of the .com TLD in 
2006.
74
 VeriSign is alleged to have publicly attacked ICANN in the media 
and through litigation to force ICANN to award it the .com contract 
without a competitive bidding process.
75
 Beyond the no-bid contract 
awarded to VeriSign for .com, ICANN has contracts with each of its 
registry operators that all but guarantee a no-bid automatic renewal when 
their terms expire.
76
 The contracts nominally provide for a competitive 
renewal process if the registry operator breaches certain terms,
77
 but this 
provision has been called “illusory.”78 By eliminating competitive bidding 
 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. The association instituted a rule by which engineers who would have competed with each 
other under normal market conditions refused “to discuss prices with potential customers until after 
negotiations have resulted in the initial selection of an engineer.” Id. at 692. 
 70. See id. at 693–96. 
 71. Id. at 693–94. 
 72. See id. at 696 (“[T]he Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption 
that competition itself is unreasonable.”). 
 73. As of March 2012, the .com and .net TLDs were by far the two largest. Together they contain 
over 115 million registered domain names, while the next most populous TLD, .org, contains just 
under 10 million. Domain Counts & Internet Statistics, WHOIS SOURCE, http://www.whois.sc/ 
internet-statistics/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).  
 74. See Coalition for ICANN Transparency v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that the contract between ICANN and VeriSign for .com was renewed in 2006 without 
competitive bidding). 
 75. VeriSign is alleged to have hired lobbyists to support its bid for automatic renewal, filled 
ICANN’s meetings with its supporters, paid reporters and bloggers to support its position, planted 
news stories critical of ICANN, and brought suit against ICANN in state and federal courts. See id. at 
505. 
 76. Each of ICANN’s registry operation contracts contains a similar automatic renewal clause: 
the agreement “shall be renewed” upon the expiration of its term unless an arbitrator or court has 
determined that the registry operator has materially breached its obligations under the contract and the 
registry operator has failed to cure the breach. See, e.g., .com Registry Agreement, supra note 43, § 4.2. 
 77. Id.  
 78. See CFIT, 611 F.3d at 502. 
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for the .com contract and competitive re-bidding for all other registry 
contracts, ICANN has arguably impeded “the ordinary give and take of the 
market place.”79 
Under a Rule of Reason analysis, a court would investigate any 
justifications for ICANN’s elimination of competitive bidding.80 Like the 
association in Professional Engineers, ICANN would likely argue that a 
restrictive bidding process stabilizes prices and ensures that the backbone 
of the DNS is managed by competent, experienced, and technically skilled 
organizations. This argument is not without merit, because the potential 
consequences of poor DNS management could cripple the Internet itself.
81
 
However, a competitive bidding process would still provide ICANN the 
opportunity to adequately vet and accredit potential registry operators to 
ensure the continued vitality of the DNS.
82
 As the Professional Engineers 
Court held, “the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the 
assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.”83 ICANN, therefore, 
has likely violated the Sherman Act by eliminating competitive bidding.  
B. Resale Price Maintenance 
The Supreme Court has had difficulty applying the Sherman Act to 
pricing agreements between firms at different levels of the supply chain, 
overruling itself twice in the last fifteen years.
84
 This type of agreement, 
known as Resale Price Maintenance (RPM),
85
 has the potential to be as 
 
 
 79. United States v. Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1975).  
 80. See Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 693–96 (applying a Rule of Reason analysis to a ban 
on competitive bidding). 
 81. An organization technically incapable of operating a root zone file could, inter alia, cause the 
connections between IP addresses and their corresponding domain names to be corrupted. As a result, 
Internet users would lose the ability to consistently connect with the websites they intend to visit, and 
third parties could intercept unwitting consumers. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 61 
(discussing “cache poisoning”).  
 82. VeriSign itself was chosen to manage the .net TLD through a competitive bidding process, 
which demonstrates that such a process would lead to the selection of a technically competent 
organization. See CFIT, 611 F.3d at 500 (noting that VeriSign’s 2005 .net agreement was the result of 
competitive bidding).  
 83. Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696. 
 84. Until recently, vertical agreements setting minimum prices were considered per se unlawful. 
See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (finding that vertical 
minimum pricing agreements are analogous to horizontal pricing agreements). Dr. Miles and its 
progeny were much criticized by economists and lower courts, but were not overruled until 2007. See 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881 (2007). The Court also 
overruled itself with respect to agreements setting maximum resale prices in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)). 
 85. See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule 
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1487 (1983) (defining resale price maintenance as 
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procompetitive as it is anticompetitive, and so is judged under the Rule of 
Reason.
86
 This was not always the case, however, and for a long period of 
time the Court considered RPM per se unlawful.
87
 The Supreme Court 
announced a per se rule for agreements setting maximum resale prices in 
Albrecht v. Herald Co.
88
 A newspaper publisher in Albrecht was 
prohibited from setting the maximum price at which its distributors could 
sell its newspapers to consumers.
89
 The Court failed to recognize that 
consumers were likely to benefit from the newspaper publisher limiting 
the ability of its distributors to charge monopoly prices in their exclusive 
territories.
90
 The Albrecht decision was roundly criticized,
91
 and it was 
finally overruled in 1997.
92
 In State Oil Co. v. Khan, the Court held that 
the Rule of Reason should be used to determine whether maximum RPM 
violates the Sherman Act.
93
 
Like all conduct analyzed under the Rule of Reason, maximum resale 
price maintenance is unlawful when its anticompetitive effects outweigh 
its procompetitive benefits.
94
 The Khan court identified some of the 
circumstances in which maximum RPM is actually beneficial to 
consumers, as when a manufacturer attempts to prevent a monopolistic 
dealer from setting prices above competitive levels.
95
 In most markets, 
manufacturers have an incentive to discourage supracompetitive pricing by 
their distributors because it would decrease demand for their products.
96
 
 
 
“vertical agreements between manufacturers, and dealers or distributors lower in the distribution chain, 
establishing the price at which the manufacturer’s product may be sold”). 
 86. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907. 
 87. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408 (“[A]greements or combinations between dealers, having for 
their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public 
interest and void.”). 
 88. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151–53 (1968). 
 89. See id. at 147–48.  
 90. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 902 (finding that the Dr. Miles rule “hinders competition and 
consumer welfare”); see also Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal With the Price-Cutting 
Retailer: When are Vertical Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST 407, 446–47 (arguing that RPM 
enhances consumer welfare).  
 91. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 889 (1981) 
(referring to the “shallowness of the reasoning in Albrecht”). 
 92. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (overruling Albrecht). 
 93. Id. at 22.  
 94. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 22; see also Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 900–04 (observing that 
a maximum fixed price could “simply be a euphemism for a cartel price”).  
 95. The manufacturer’s economic interests are best served by preventing a monopolist-dealer 
from charging monopoly prices because high prices would reduce demand and overall sales. See Khan 
v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1362 (“A supplier might, however, fix a maximum resale price in order 
to prevent his dealers from exploiting a monopoly position”); see also Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 168 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (asserting that a maximum price fixing arrangement might protect consumers 
from monopolist-dealers). 
 96. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 159 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that price ceilings “prevent 
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For example, in the case of newspapers, decreased demand would drive 
down circulation and thereby decrease newspaper publishers’ advertising 
revenue.
97
 
However, the domain name market is different from the newspaper 
market. Maximum RPM does not have the same beneficial effect because 
demand is relatively inelastic; that is, consumer demand for domain names 
is largely unaffected by changes in price.
98
 Under normal market 
conditions, the power of a seller to set prices “is determined by its buyers’ 
responsiveness to changes in price.”99 In contrast, sellers have little 
incentive to offer low prices in a market where demand is inelastic. 
ICANN has no incentive to discourage or prevent individual registry 
operators like VeriSign from charging supracompetitive prices because 
consumers have nowhere else to turn.
100
 With no viable alternatives to the 
ICANN-controlled DNS,
101
 consumers will not alter their behavior in 
response to price fluctuations as they would in a typical market.  
Buyers’ responsiveness is a function of two factors: “buyers’ 
preferences and the availability of suitable substitutes.”102 In the domain 
name market, both of these factors work to decrease buyers’ 
responsiveness to changes in price. Because ICANN has added few new 
TLDs to the DNS, buyers’ preferences have changed very little.103 
 
 
retailers or wholesalers from reaping monopoly or supracompetitive profits”). “Supracompetitive” 
prices are prices that are higher than could be sustained in a competitive market. See Brooke Group 
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 245 (1993) (describing supracompetitive 
prices as “characteristic of a textbook monopoly”). 
 97. See id. at 169 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 98. See infra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. The most well-known principle of economics 
is the law of supply and demand. An important measure of consumer demand is “price elasticity of 
demand,” defined as the “proportionate change in demand given a change in price.” See Patrick L. 
Anderson et al., Price Elasticity of Demand, MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY (Nov. 13, 1997), 
http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=1247. Goods for which demand is not responsive to price 
changes are referred to as “inelastic.” Id. Typically, items that have few substitutes or those for which 
the purchase cannot be delayed, such as staple goods or food, are inelastic goods. Id.  
 99. David Scheffman, Statistical Measures of Market Power: Uses and Abuses, 60 ANTITRUST 
901, 902 (1992).  
 100. Because ICANN controls the DNS root, it is the only “manufacturer” of domain names for 
purposes of an antitrust analysis. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 51 (“ICANN controls 
access to the system by which the overwhelming majority of registrants obtain domain names.”). 
 101. Alternatives to the ICANN-controlled DNS were created in the late 1990s. These so-called 
“alternate roots” at one time had high hopes of challenging the dominance of the legacy root. But the 
existence of multiple roots would cause serious confusion, with no authoritative source for the 
resolution of domain name queries. Primarily because of the impracticality of such a model, the 
alternate roots never truly rivaled the legacy root. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 21–22.  
 102. Scheffman, supra note 99, at 902.  
 103. Between 2006 and 2007, for example, demand for registrations in .com, .net, and .org grew at 
roughly identical rates, notwithstanding the difference in price. See 2007 Secondary Domain Market 
Study, SEDO.COM, 6 (2007), http://www.sedo.com/press/domainmarketstudy2007.pdf (finding that 
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Moreover, suitable substitutes for most domain names do not exist. 
Domain names within the .com, .net, and .org TLDs, for example, have 
such unique profiles that demand for them has remained constant, 
notwithstanding wide price differences between TLDs.
104
 ICANN and the 
registry operators of lucrative TLDs would see little decline in demand for 
domain names as a result of supracompetitive pricing,
105
 but consumers 
would suffer by paying higher prices than they otherwise would. 
As part of their renegotiated contract for operation of the .com TLD in 
2006, ICANN and VeriSign agreed to set the maximum price VeriSign 
could charge its registrars at $6.00 per domain name, with a 7 percent 
annual increase.
106
 The plaintiffs in an antitrust action against both ICANN 
and VeriSign offered evidence that VeriSign’s competitors would have 
charged as little as $3.00 per domain name and still provide the same level 
of service.
107
 This skewed result was a product of the lack of competitive 
bidding for VeriSign’s services and further undermines the legitimacy of 
that process.
108
 The .com agreement’s allegedly supracompetitive price 
displays, at best, ICANN’s complicity with the registry operators’ pricing 
arrangements and, at worst, its active participation in a scheme to set 
prices above competitive levels. 
Both minimum resale price maintenance and maximum resale price 
maintenance are potentially harmful to competition, but minimum RPM 
tends to receive closer scrutiny because of the greater probability that it 
 
 
between 2006 and 2007, the number of domain names sold through Sedo increased by 53 percent in 
.com, 57 percent in .net, and 54 percent in .org). 
 104. See id. (noting that the average price for domain names in .com, .net, .org, and .biz rose 54 
percent, 37 percent, 27 percent, and 27 percent respectively, even though the increase in total domain 
names sold for all four remained relatively constant, at about 55 percent).  
 105. In the inelastic domain name market, price does not affect demand as it would in a 
competitive market. Between 2006 and 2007, after VeriSign was awarded the contract for .com, the 
demand for domain names in .com actually increased—unaffected by the price. See .com Registry 
Report Monthly Reports—July 2006–July 2007, ICANN.ORG, http://www.icann.org/en/tlds/monthly-
reports/index.html. 
 106. See .com Registry Agreement, supra note 43, § 7.3(d). ICANN has also set maximum prices 
for the .net and .org TLDs, but those agreements were the product of a competitive bidding process 
and so presumably represent competitive prices. See Coalition for ICANN Transparency v. VeriSign, 
Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 504–05 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 107. CFIT, 611 F.3d at 503. Although these numbers seem small in the abstract, they become 
quite substantial when the sheer number of registered domain names is considered. VeriSign alone 
manages (and receives yearly fees for) over 95 million domain names, earning it over $600 million in 
revenue in 2009. VeriSign Annual Report–2009, VERISIGN, 5 (Apr. 2010), http://files.shareholder 
.com/downloads/VRSN/1564565037x0x365048/ea1e2339-4582-4149-bf73-5391991cc3c1/Verisign 
Annual_Report.pdf.  
 108. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
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simply stands in the place of an agreement fixing prices.
109
 Maximum 
RPM, on the other hand, is more rarely harmful to competition because of 
its tendency to keep prices low—one of the key purposes of antitrust 
law.
110
 However, an agreement that establishes maximum RPM is suspect 
when it serves only as a screen to disguise a uniform supracompetitive 
price.
111
 For example, when a manufacturer and a distributor agree on a 
maximum resale price in a market with little price elasticity, the distributor 
can use that maximum to conceal its decision to prevent prices from 
fluctuating as they should.  
Because ICANN has no incentive to discourage VeriSign’s charging 
supracompetitive prices,
112
 it agreed to a maximum resale price higher 
than would have been set by a competitive market. Although nominally a 
maximum price, the contract price instead operates as a single uniform 
price.
113
 While in theory this keeps the price of domain name registrations 
from exceeding a certain amount, in practice it prevents them from falling 
as well. VeriSign is able to charge more than the market would have 
allowed otherwise, to the detriment of consumers.
114
 A court applying the 
Rule of Reason may therefore conclude that ICANN’s maximum resale 
price maintenance in the .com TLD violates the Sherman Act. 
C. Essential Facilities Doctrine 
Under certain narrowly circumscribed conditions, a firm can violate 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act if it refuses to deal with a competitor.
115
 
 
 
 109. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007) (finding 
that vertical agreements setting minimum resale prices are unlawful per se to the extent that they are 
“entered upon to facilitate [a] cartel”). 
 110. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (finding 
that price cutting is “the very essence of competition” and is the kind of conduct “the antitrust laws are 
designed to protect”). 
 111. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982).  
 112. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 113. The concern that maximum RPM could disguise minimum RPM animated the Albrecht 
Court’s establishing a per se rule for maximum RPM. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 
(1968). When dealers always or almost always set their prices at the maximum price maintained by a 
manufacturer, the price functions as a floor rather than a ceiling. The agreement allows dealers to 
charge more than they would have been able to charge without the agreement, because their pricing is 
disguised by the existence of an illusory “cap.” See Maricopa Cnty., 457 U.S. at 348 (“[Maximum 
RPM] may be a masquerade for an agreement to fix uniform prices . . . .”).  
 114. See Coalition for ICANN Transparency v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 504 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Harm to consumers in the form of higher prices resulting from competitive restraints has long been 
held to constitute an actual injury to competition in the Section 1 context . . . .”).  
 115. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600–602 (1985) 
(discussing the qualified nature of the right to refuse to deal); see also Philip Areeda, Essential 
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Typically, a manufacturer is under no obligation to deal with potential 
rivals and can refuse with impunity.
116
 However, the Supreme Court 
controversially carved out a narrow exception to this general principle in 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
117
 The Aspen Skiing 
Court held that a firm violated Section 2 when it abandoned a prior course 
of dealing with a competitor, refused to deal, and elected to forgo short-
term profits in order to force its competitor out of business and reap the 
resulting monopoly profits.
118
 In Aspen Skiing, the Court obliquely 
referenced the “essential facilities” doctrine,119 an invention never 
formally recognized by the Supreme Court that extends antitrust liability 
to a firm that has absolute control over a resource and refuses to provide 
access to a competitor.
120
 The essential facilities doctrine has never 
received acceptance by legal scholars because of its tendency to 
discourage competition,
121
 and even those who favor its existence 
acknowledge that “it is properly applied only in rare cases.”122 
The Supreme Court called its Aspen Skiing holding into question in 
Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, calling it “at 
or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.”123 The Court held that a firm 
will be liable under Section 2 only if it abandons a prior course of dealing 
with a competitor for anticompetitive reasons,
124
 or if it is itself a 
competitor in the downstream market for its products—giving it a 
monopolistic incentive to refuse to deal with downstream competitors.
125
 
Although it refused to either adopt or repudiate the essential facilities 
 
 
Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 852–53 (defining the 
essential facilities doctrine as “requiring the creator of an asset to share it with a rival”). 
 116. This principle is referred to as the Colgate doctrine, after United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 
U.S. 300, 307 (1919); see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (“A 
manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long 
as it does so independently.”). 
 117. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 585. 
 118. See id. at 610–11. 
 119. The Court focused exclusively on the jury instruction given by the trial court and addressed 
the essential facilities doctrine only to announce it would not consider the issue. See id. at 611 n.44.  
 120. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(establishing the elements for an essential facilities claim). 
 121. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 115, at 852 (“There is no general duty to share. Compulsory 
access, if it exists at all, is and should be very exceptional.”).  
 122. Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 46. 
 123. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).  
 124. See id. at 409. 
 125. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 45 (observing that Supreme Court cases involving 
essential facilities claims typically require that the defendant “participate[] in a competitive 
downstream market”). 
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doctrine,
126
 the Court joined many commentators in severely limiting the 
doctrine’s applicability.127 
At first glance, ICANN seems like a prime target for the essential 
facilities doctrine because it unilaterally controls the DNS and limits 
access to it.
128
 ICANN has greatly restrained the introduction of new TLDs 
to the DNS, and consequently, it has limited the number of registry 
operators that can compete with each other for registry services.
129
 When 
ICANN was founded in 1998, only seven generic TLDs existed.
130
 
Twice—in 2001 and 2003—ICANN introduced new TLDs, but the 
number remains quite small despite consumer demand for more TLD 
competition.
131
 Although millions of second-level domain names have 
been registered since ICANN’s formation, in 2008 the number of TLDs 
had grown to just twenty.
132
 “The most striking feature of the ICANN 
regime,” writes one prominent author, “is its perpetuation of scarcity at the 
top level of the name space.”133 
In 2008, after a years-long consultation process that traversed 
numerous revisions and iterations, ICANN formally decided to implement 
a new program for regularly introducing new TLDs.
134
 The New gTLD 
 
 
 126. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411. 
 127. See Areeda, supra note 115, at 853 (criticizing the essential facilities concept and asserting 
that “[n]o court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably 
supervise”). 
 128. See Affirmation of Commitments by the United States Department of Commerce and the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 2 (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.ntia.doc. 
gov/files/ntia/publications/affirmation_of_commitments_2009.pdf [hereinafter Affirmation of 
Commitments] (defining ICANN’s primary commitment as coordinating “the Internet DNS at the 
overall level”); see also Karl M. Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain 
Name Policy, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 390 (2003). 
 129. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 23–24; see also Blue, supra note 5, at 397. 
 130. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 131. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. During the first round of new TLD 
introductions in 2000, forty-seven applicants paid a nonrefundable $50,000 fee to be considered for a 
new TLD, but only seven were selected to be added to the DNS. Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 
48–49. Froomkin and Lemley humorously refer to these as the “not-so-magnificent seven” because 
they have extremely limited appeal. Id. at 24 n.112. The TLDs added to the root during these rounds 
included “.museum, .coop, and .aero which are likely to be of only minor interest.” Id.  
 132. Of these twenty-one generic TLDs, only sixteen are operated by ICANN. These are .aero, 
.asia, .biz, .cat, .com, .coop, .info, .jobs, .mobi, .museum, .name, .net, .org, .pro, .tel, and .travel. See 
Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), supra note 15. The remaining four TLDs—.edu, .gov, .int, and .mil—are 
legacy TLDs from before ICANN’s formation and are operated by other entities, but ICANN retains 
control over the root zone files for all TLDs. Id. In 2010, ICANN finally approved the .xxx TLD, 
which will bring the total number to twenty-one when it becomes active. See infra note 214 and 
accompanying text. 
 133. MUELLER, supra note 21, at 255. 
 134. The primary policy development work on the New gTLD Program was done by one of 
ICANN’s subcommittees, the Generic Names Supporting Organization, with the assistance of the 
Governmental Advisory Committee, the At-Large Advisory committee, and a host of other supporting 
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Program creates a mechanism for adding new TLDs to the DNS,
135
 but 
significant barriers to entry remain. For example, applicants for new TLDs 
must pay a nonrefundable evaluation fee of $185,000, and there is no set 
timeline for evaluation and approval.
136
 ICANN warns any potential 
applicants that they may encounter additional fees, that the process may 
take up to twenty months, and that each applicant’s operating plans will be 
closely scrutinized.
137
 Nevertheless, the New gTLD Program represents a 
substantial step toward increasing competition in the domain name market.  
Because of the questionable contemporary relevance of the essential 
facilities doctrine and ICANN’s recent steps to increase TLD competition, 
it is unlikely that ICANN would be subject to antitrust liability under such 
a theory. Despite ICANN’s exclusive control over the DNS root, it does 
not meet the Aspen Skiing conditions for two reasons. First, it has no prior 
course of dealing with registry operators that it has now excluded for no 
legitimate reason.
138
 Second, ICANN is not a registry operator itself and so 
has no economic incentive to exclude competitors from the downstream 
TLD market.
139
 Moreover, the New gTLD Program represents ICANN’s 
attempt to increase TLD competition.
140
  
 
 
committees and constituency groups. For a detailed history of the development process, see GNSO 
Policy Work on New gTLDs, ICANN.ORG, http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds (last visited Mar. 15, 
2012). The process has been plagued by delays for years. The final version of the New gTLD 
Applicant Guidebook was made available in September 2011, but applications themselves were not 
accepted until January 12, 2012. See New Generic Top-Level Domains Fact Sheet, supra note 24. 
These applications will be evaluated after April 12, 2012, with approvals coming “as little as 9 
months” later. New Generic Top-Level Domains—Frequently Asked Questions, ICANN.ORG, http:// 
newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/customer-service/faqs/faqs-en (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). However, 
applicants are warned that “the evaluation process could take up to 20 months to complete.” Id. 
 135. The New gTLD Program prescribes a procedure for applicants to propose new TLDs, such as 
.nyc and .sport, and have them evaluated based on objective criteria. See Carolyn Duffy Marsan, 
ICANN Nears Expansion of Domain Names, PC WORLD (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.pcworld.com/ 
article/209620/icann_nears_expansion_of_domain_names.html (describing the New gTLD Program).  
 136. See New Generic Top-Level Domains—Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 134; see also 
Casey Johnston, ICANN Set to Open Top-Level Domain Floodgates, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 3, 2010, 
4:07 PM), http://arstechnica.com/web/ news/2010/11/icann-to-open-top-level-domain-floodgates.ars. 
 137. See New Generic Top-Level Domains—Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 134. 
 138. Because of ICANN’s relatively short history, there are no spurned former registry operators 
in the mold of Aspen Skiing.  
 139. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 48 (“ICANN acts as neither a registrar nor a 
registry . . . .”). Because ICANN receives fees from each of its registry operators, it seems in its 
interest to create as many TLDs as possible in order to increase its revenue from the registry operators 
that manage those TLDs. See id. at 49. Indeed, under the New gTLD Program, ICANN collects a 
nonrefundable $185,000 evaluation fee for each new applicant. See supra note 136. 
 140. The purposes of the program are overtly aligned with the purposes of the Sherman Act: to 
“pav[e] the way for increased consumer choice by facilitating competition among registry service 
providers.” See New Generic Top-Level Domains—Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 134. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
948 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:931 
 
 
 
 
The barriers to entry erected by the New gTLD Program would likely 
be considered valid justifications because of the need to enforce technical 
standards and preserve the security of the DNS.
141
 While the $185,000 
application fee and the lengthy and invasive evaluation process for new 
TLD applicants will deter some competitors from entering the 
marketplace, those restrictions are likely necessary to ensure that new 
TLD operators possess the financial solvency and technical expertise to 
successfully administer their TLD.
142
 The reasonable nature of these 
conditions, coupled with the narrow scope of the essential facilities 
doctrine, will likely lead a court to conclude that ICANN has not violated 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act under an essential facilities theory. 
However, ICANN has damaged competition by eliminating competitive 
bidding for registry contracts,
143
 and possibly by maintaining maximum 
resale prices in the .com TLD.
144
 Despite these abuses, no court has ever 
seriously examined ICANN’s anticompetitive activity. Part III explores 
the possible reasons for the reluctance of courts and antitrust enforcement 
authorities to investigate ICANN’s conduct.  
III. WHY ICANN HAS ESCAPED ANTITRUST SCRUTINY 
ICANN is “an unusual organization.”145 Because of its unique 
character, ICANN has been ignored by American antitrust enforcement 
authorities
146
 and remains largely resistant to antitrust scrutiny.
147
 Antitrust 
enforcers and the courts have likely tolerated ICANN’s competitive abuses 
because the organization has no obvious analogue.
148
 Moreover, its 
 
 
 141. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 51 (predicting that courts would accept ICANN’s 
technical expertise on matters of DNS stability and security, giving it the benefit of the doubt in order 
to avoid a potential DNS failure).  
 142. Id.; see also gTLD Applicant Guidebook: Version 2011-09-19, ICANN.ORG, 2–21 to –22 
(Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/rfp-clean-19sep11-en.pdf (describing the 
technical and financial evaluation procedures for new TLD applicants). 
 143. See supra Part II.A. 
 144. See supra Part II.B. 
 145. VeriSign, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Nos., No. CV 04-1292 AHM, 2004 
WL 2095696, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2004). 
 146. Neither the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice nor the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Bureau of Competition has taken any action against ICANN. In fact, the Antitrust 
Division regularly advises the Commerce Department in its oversight of ICANN. Antitrust Division 
Update: Spring 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 3 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/244014.pdf.  
 147. Private antitrust actions against ICANN have proven remarkably unsuccessful. See, e.g., 
VeriSign, 2004 WL 2095696, at *8 (dismissing claim because plaintiff could not demonstrate a 
conspiracy in restraint of trade). 
 148. See Is ICANN’s New Generation of Internet Domain Name Selection Process Thwarting 
Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/5
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relationship with the U.S. government is structurally and politically 
unique.
149
 ICANN is at once public and private,
150
 technical and 
political,
151
 national and global.
152
 This Part discusses how ICANN’s 
uniqueness confounds the application of the antitrust laws. Section A 
describes how its decision-making procedures obscure the source of its 
decisions. Section B argues that ICANN’s uncertain relationship with the 
U.S. Government makes application of the antitrust laws difficult. 
A. Multistakeholder Model of Governance 
ICANN’s opaque and confusing decision-making process obscures the 
sources of and rationales for its decisions. By muddying the water, 
ICANN confounds antitrust scrutiny. ICANN was founded “for the benefit 
of the Internet community as a whole.”153 To embody and reflect the 
democratic ideals of the early Internet, ICANN adopted a multistakeholder 
model of governance,
154
 in which private constituencies contribute to a 
“bottom-up” policy-making process with little or no direct government 
involvement.
155
 The constituency groups consist of commercial and non-
commercial Internet users, registries and registrars, Internet Service 
Providers, and intellectual property owners.
156
 Significant policy decisions 
are made by a sixteen-member Board of Directors,
157
 the members of 
which are chosen by the various constituency groups through a myriad of 
 
 
on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 15 (2001) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, then-Chairman of the 
Board, ICANN) (describing ICANN as a “unique entity”). 
 149. See A. Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 93, 94–95 (2002) (“[T]he form of the U.S. government’s relationship with ICANN is unusual, 
and the substance unique.”). 
 150. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 132. 
 151. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Pondering the Politics of Private Procedures: The 
Case of ICANN, 4 ISJLP 345, 386 (2008) (“ICANN is not only a technical organization concerned 
with the technical management of Internet addresses and numbers, but also a political organization 
with the power to create policies for the functioning of the Internet domain name system.”). 
 152. See Milton Mueller et al., Internet and Global Governance: Principles and Norms for a New 
Regime, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 237, 238 (2007). 
 153. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 1, art. 4. 
 154. See Slavka Antonova, Deconstructing an Experiment in Global Internet Governance: The 
ICANN Case, 2008 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 13–14 (2008). The multistakeholder model was 
championed by neoliberals in the United States and Western Europe as an experiment in global 
governance for a post-nation-state globalized world. Id. at 14. 
 155. Id. at 3; see also Bruner, supra note 26, at 156 (“Government officials, meanwhile, are 
explicitly barred from board [of directors] membership.”). 
 156. ICANN Bylaws, ICANN.ORG, art. VII, § 2 (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/about/ 
governance/bylaws (describing the various groups that send delegates to the Nominating Committee, 
which in turn selects members of ICANN’s Board of Directors). 
 157. Id. art. II; see also Bruner, supra note 26, at 155 (noting the dominance of “an all-powerful 
board”). 
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subgroups, advisory committees, and supporting organizations according 
to an impenetrable web of rules and procedures.
158
  
With such a large group of potential decision makers, all with different 
and sometimes contradictory interests, ICANN’s complicated decision-
making process makes antitrust analysis problematic. The 
multistakeholder model, and the complex procedures put in place to 
implement it, obscure both who makes decisions,
159
 and why those 
decisions are made.
160
 The confusing nature of the multistakeholder model 
frustrates the application of the antitrust laws. 
1. Who Makes Decisions 
ICANN’s procedures obscure the source of its decisions. ICANN 
purports to seek and accept “broad, informed participation” and often 
professes its accountability “to the Internet community.”161 However, its 
decision-making process allows for little democratic involvement.
162
 
Critics have noted that ICANN’s Board of Directors is dominated by 
commercial interests,
163
 as are the review panels meant to ensure ICANN’s 
transparency and accountability.
164
 ICANN’s governance structure favors 
those interests that possess the resources, time, and money to participate in 
its complicated procedures.
165
 The Nominating Committee, which chooses 
 
 
 158. See Lawrence B. Solum, Models of Internet Governance 59 (Ill. Pub. L. Research Paper No. 
07-25, Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1136825 
(“ICANN has an organizational structure that is almost baroque in its complexity.”), cited in Bruner, 
supra note 26, at 155 n.172. 
 159. See Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 29, at 160 (“[ICANN] proved [to] be corporatist in 
form, but not in spirit, as substantial interest groups remained unrepresented while ICANN took 
critical decisions.”). ICANN has successfully covered its tracks by professing to accept input from all 
interested parties, while allowing commercial interests to “entrench themselves.” Id.  
 160. See id. at 24 n.17 (noting the “mind-boggling complexity of ICANN’s internal structures”); 
see also Bruner, supra note 26, at 155 (“ICANN has been strongly criticized for failing to achieve 
open and transparent governance of the DNS.”). 
 161. E.g., ICANN Bylaws, supra note 156, art. I, § 2. 
 162. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 151, at 354 (“[M]any critics complain that ICANN’s 
decisions are far from democratic because democratic institutions . . . have no role in ICANN 
governance.”). Structural changes within ICANN in 2002–2003 further limited the role of democratic 
groups like the at-large constituencies in ways that “diluted” democratic representation “through a 
series of mechanisms and committees.” Id. at 388. 
 163. Bruner, supra note 26, at 155.  
 164. See Anja Kovacs, The ICANN-US DOC ‘Affirmation of Commitments’—A Step Forward?, 
NONCOMMERCIAL USERS CONSTITUENCY (NCUC) (Oct. 6, 2009, 7:43 PM), http://ncdnhc.org/ 
profiles/blogs/the-icannus-doc-affirmation-of (arguing, on behalf of one of ICANN’s constituent 
groups, that the review panels will be populated with insiders and, like ICANN as a whole, “dominated 
by large businesses”). 
 165. Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 29, at 71 (“ICANN had adopted a Byzantine structure 
that privileged some interests, primarily corporate and commercial.”). Froomkin notes the oddity of an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/5
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eight of the sixteen voting members of the powerful Board of Directors,
166
 
is comprised almost entirely of individuals chosen by commercial interests 
or by other parts of ICANN itself.
167
 One critic has thus called ICANN “a 
servant of the intellectual property and domain name registry interests.”168 
These commercial interests are separated from the Board by the 
Nominating Committee and other supporting organizations within 
ICANN, but their influence is nonetheless substantial.
169
  
The exact nature of the influence exerted over ICANN by these 
powerful interests is shielded by ICANN’s bureaucracy. ICANN’s 
complicated organizational structure makes it difficult for an antitrust 
plaintiff to demonstrate an anticompetitive conspiracy because the groups 
that take part in any given ICANN decision cannot be clearly identified.
170
 
As an organization in which competitors work together to craft policy, 
ICANN should be scrutinized for the relationships it creates between those 
competitors.
171
 When erstwhile competitors collaborate to harm 
competition—even as part of a lawful association—they violate the 
antitrust laws.
172
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly prevented professional 
associations from influencing prices when the active participants in the 
 
 
Internet regulatory body requiring physical presence at meetings, for example, to demonstrate the 
greater influence wielded by interests with the time and money to devote to ICANN. Id. at 160–61.  
 166. ICANN Bylaws, supra note 156, art. VI, § 2. Six of the other eight directors are chosen by the 
three supporting organizations—the Address Supporting Organization, the Country-Code Names 
Supporting Organization, and the Generic Names Supporting Organization—one by the At-Large 
Community, and the final voting member is ICANN’s Chief Executive Officer. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Comment of Karl Auerbach, 6 (Feb. 6, 2008) (in response to The Continued Transition of the 
Technical Coordination and Management of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System: 
Midterm Review of the Joint Project Agreement, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., Docket No. 
071023616-7617-01), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/jpacomments 
2007/jpacomment_030.pdf.  
 169. Bruner, supra note 26, at 155; see also Anatkova, supra note 154, at 14 (observing that a 
failure to properly balance commercial and non-commercial interests in ICANN’s organizational 
structure led to the “detriment of the non-commercial and end-user representatives.”). 
 170. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 155 (“[N]otwithstanding ICANN’s non-profit legal status, one 
essentially finds an all-powerful board dominated by commercial interests.”); see also Viktor Mayer-
Schönberger & Malte Ziewitz, Jefferson Rebuffed: The United States and the Future of Internet 
Governance, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 188, 192 (2007) (opining that “a combination of 
differently aligned economic interests” work to maintain ICANN’s power over the DNS). 
 171. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 352–53 (1982) (finding a price-
fixing scheme by a physician’s association unlawful, in part because the prices were fixed by the 
doctors themselves). 
 172. See generally Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). In 
Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court established that lawfully created professional associations 
may collaborate to set industry-wide standards, but may not set prices without violating Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. Id. at 695–96.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
952 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:931 
 
 
 
 
associations are the competitors themselves.
173
 When independent 
economic actors collaborate on price, they “fit squarely into the horizontal 
price-fixing mold.”174 
Within ICANN, multiple potential competitors (registrars, registries, 
Internet Service Providers, etc.) take part in the decision-making 
process.
175
 A court evaluating antitrust concerns would attempt to 
determine whether a group of competitors compelled the association to 
harm competition in the market in which they participate.
176
 Typically, the 
answer is obvious because trade associations are usually controlled by a 
single group of professionals, creating little doubt as to the source of the 
association’s decisions.177 The commercial interests that exert so much 
influence over ICANN’s Board of Directors are largely hidden behind its 
complicated bureaucracy.
178
 Indeed, a federal district court has dismissed 
one of the legal challenges to ICANN’s antitrust abuses because the 
plaintiff could not demonstrate that competing interests exercised 
sufficient control over ICANN’s decisions.179  
However, the challenges faced by plaintiffs are not insurmountable. 
While ICANN’s procedures obscure the source of its decisions, relevant 
information is available to those who thoroughly investigate ICANN’s 
decisions and follow its public meetings.
180
 Plaintiffs who can devote the 
 
 
 173. See Maricopa Cnty., 457 U.S. at 349. The Court has rejected the argument that the unique 
requirements of certain organizations merit different treatment under the antitrust laws. In Maricopa 
County, the Court found that an agreement among doctors to influence prices did not alter the antitrust 
analysis. Id.  
 174. Id. at 357. 
 175. See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.  
 176. If competing economic entities—registries, registrars, domain name owners, etc.—exert 
enough influence over ICANN to “control” its decisions, those competitors have conspired in violation 
of the Sherman Act. See Hahn v. Oregon Physicians’ Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(finding that a physicians’ association could set prices so long as the “relevant group of competitive 
providers . . . do not control the health care plan.”).  
 177. The Supreme Court addressed just such an organization in Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 
at 681–82.  
 178. See supra note 169.  
 179. One of only two antitrust actions filed against ICANN was dismissed because the plaintiff 
failed to plead enough facts to demonstrate that competitors exerted “control” over ICANN’s 
decisions. VeriSign, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Nos., No. CV 04-1292 AHM, 2004 
WL 2095696, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2004). The current ICANN Bylaws require the Board to 
accept the decisions of both the ccNSO and GNSO under certain conditions, giving rise to the 
inference that in some circumstances, competing interests do exercise “control” over ICANN. ICANN 
Bylaws, supra note 156, at Annex A, § 13, Annex B, § 15. 
 180. ICANN holds three public meetings per year in locations throughout the world. Anyone may 
participate, either in person or remotely via chat rooms. About ICANN Meetings, ICANN.ORG,http:// 
meetings.icann.org/about (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). Although ICANN purports to discuss 
“contractual issues with the retail and wholesale arms of the Domain Name System” at these meetings, 
its controversial 2006 renewal of its contract with VeriSign, see supra Part II.A, was never discussed 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/5
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considerable resources necessary to properly present this information to a 
court may succeed in advancing past the pleading stage, as did the 
plaintiffs in Coalition for ICANN Transparency v. VeriSign, Inc.
181
 In this 
case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court’s decision dismissing the 
action for failure to state a claim and remanded the case for further pretrial 
proceedings.
182
 
2. How and Why Decisions Are Made 
The opacity of the decision-making process obscures how and why 
ICANN’s decisions are made. All policy decisions are made by the Board 
of Directors, but the Directors are chosen and advised by multiple 
subgroups, committees, and constituencies.
183
 For example, two Directors 
are chosen by the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO)—one 
of three primary supporting groups.
184
 The GNSO consists of Stakeholder 
Groups, which themselves are made up of various interested parties, and is 
organized into a bicameral council that makes recommendations to the 
ICANN Board.
185
 The sources of the recommendations are buried under 
this mountain of bureaucracy.
186
 ICANN’s complicated procedures make it 
difficult for potential plaintiffs to prove antitrust abuses. 
Antitrust analysis often hinges on whether business decisions were 
motivated “not by competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice.”187 
Because ICANN’s decision-making process is hidden behind a shield of 
bureaucracy, courts may find it difficult to determine the underlying 
motivations that drive its actions. Although antitrust scholars are 
 
 
at a public meeting. See Archives of the ICANN Meetings in São Paulo, Brazil, ICANN.ORG (Dec. 2–8, 
2006), http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/saopaulo/archives.html. 
 181. Coalition for ICANN Transparency v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2010). 
Although ICANN itself was dropped from this litigation at an early stage by consent of the parties, the 
conduct at issue is the alleged conspiracy surrounding the 2006 contract renewal between VeriSign 
and ICANN. See supra Part II.A. 
 182. CFIT, 611 F.3d at 509–10. This action was subsequently dismissed by the district court for 
lack of standing. See Coalition for ICANN Transparency v. VeriSign, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). The district court thus never reached the question of VeriSign’s, and by implication 
ICANN’s, alleged antitrust violations.  
 183. ICANN Bylaws, supra note 156, art. VI, § 2. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. art. X, § 2–3. 
 186. See Solum, supra note 158, at 59–60 (observing that ICANN’s “international bureaucracy” 
has a “complex organizational structure” with numerous interested parties).  
 187. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).  
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increasingly skeptical of the use of intent to evaluate antitrust abuses,
188
 
the Supreme Court continues to invoke anticompetitive intent, particularly 
in cases under the so-called essential facilities doctrine.
189
 If ICANN’s 
decision-making process were more transparent, antitrust enforcement 
authorities could more easily determine whether ICANN has intended to 
harm competition or has merely pursued a “valid business strategy.”190 As 
long as information about ICANN’s complicated decision-making process 
remains difficult to obtain, proper application of the antitrust laws will 
remain difficult.
191
 
B. ICANN’s Relationship with the Department of Commerce 
ICANN’s ties to the U.S. Department of Commerce make antitrust 
analysis difficult because of the well-established principle that the antitrust 
laws do not apply to the government or its instrumentalities.
192
 Although it 
is far from a federal agency, ICANN’s relationship with the United States 
government deters antitrust scrutiny, particularly by federal antitrust 
enforcement authorities.
193
 The relationship between ICANN and the 
federal government has changed significantly over ICANN’s twelve-year 
lifespan, but the precise contours of that relationship remain “murky.”194 
Between its formation in 1998 and 2009, ICANN was largely a creature of 
the Department of Commerce (DOC), and its power was “derivative of the 
 
 
 188. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 
HANDBOOK 314–15 (2007) (quoting two prominent antitrust scholars, Philip Areeda and Herbert 
Hovenkamp, who criticized the Trinko Court’s reliance on intent and its search for malicious purpose).  
 189. See supra Part II.C. In Trinko, the Supreme Court characterized its earlier holding in Aspen 
Skiing as one based on a finding that the defendant’s conduct was driven by an intent to harm 
competition. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. Before Aspen Skiing and Trinko, there was a trend in the lower 
courts to abandon an analysis of intent, but after Trinko, the lower courts have followed the Supreme 
Court’s lead. Compare Olympia Equip. Leasing v. W. Union Tel., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(finding malicious motivation “irrelevant”) with Am. Cent. E. Tex. Gas v. Union Pac. Res. Group, 93 
F. App’x 1, 9 (5th Cir. 2004) (interpreting Trinko to contemplate antitrust liability based on 
“anticompetitive motives”).  
 190. East Texas Gas, 93 F. App’x at 9. The Fifth Circuit affirmed an arbitrator’s finding that the 
defendant’s conduct was not grounded in a “valid business strategy” based on considerable testimony 
from the parties. Id. at 9–10. Such evidence would be difficult to gather from ICANN because of its 
structure. 
 191. Only two antitrust actions have been filed against ICANN as of March 23, 2012. The first 
was dismissed at the pleading stage. See supra note 179. In the second, the plaintiffs dropped ICANN 
as a defendant, but the litigation has proceeded. See supra note 181.  
 192. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (“The Sherman Act . . . gives no hint that it 
was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state.”). 
 193. Neither the Department of Justice nor the Federal Trade Commission, the two agencies with 
primary responsibility for enforcing the antitrust laws, have pursued or investigated ICANN. See supra 
note 146. 
 194. Manheim & Solum, supra note 128, at 374.  
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U.S. government’s own authority.”195 However, in response to intense 
international pressure, ICANN and DOC signed a new agreement in 
September 2009—an Affirmation of Commitments that greatly relaxed 
DOC’s policy oversight over ICANN.196 Notwithstanding this new 
agreement, DOC retains ultimate authority over Internet naming and 
addressing.
197
  
Government action has long been immune from antitrust liability,
198
 
but the waters become muddied when a private actor claims to be acting at 
the government’s behest or in furtherance of public policy.199 Although 
incorporated as a non-profit, ICANN would undoubtedly argue that it 
should be immune from antitrust liability as a state actor.
200
 Under the 
state actor doctrine, a private party may claim the government’s antitrust 
immunity when two conditions are met: first, they must act pursuant to a 
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” state policy; and second, 
their conduct must be “actively supervised” by the State itself.201 The 
Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to find antitrust immunity for 
private actors under this test and will do so only when “the State has 
played a substantial role in determining the specifics of the economic 
policy.”202 “Absent such a program of supervision,” the Court reasoned, 
“there is no realistic assurance that a private party’s anticompetitive 
conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the private party’s 
individual interests.”203  
ICANN is unlikely to be given antitrust immunity under the state actor 
doctrine, but because of the still-uncertain nature of ICANN’s relationship 
with DOC, courts may find it challenging to faithfully apply the Supreme 
Court’s test. DOC’s authority over ICANN has two different but important 
 
 
 195. Bruner, supra note 26, at 156. 
 196. The change was largely in response to political pressure from the international community. 
See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
 197. See infra notes 228–36 and accompanying text.  
 198. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. 
 199. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 31 (“A closer question is presented when the 
defendant is a private actor who claims to be acting in accordance with state policy.”). 
 200. See Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 29, at 113–25 (discussing the reasons why ICANN 
might be considered a state actor). 
 201. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). The 
Supreme Court in California Retail narrowly applied the state action doctrine and found that a wine 
dealers’ association was not immune from the antitrust laws, even though it was acting according to a 
clearly articulated California state policy, because the state did not actively supervise the association. 
Id. at 105–06. 
 202. F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992); see also Froomkin & Lemley, supra 
note 4, at 32 (“[T]he clear articulation and active supervision requirements of late have proven difficult 
hurdles to clear.”). 
 203. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988); see also Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 32.  
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aspects: DOC’s oversight of the direction of DNS policy,204 and DOC’s 
control over whether ICANN continues in its role as administrator of the 
DNS.
205
 To determine whether ICANN deserves antitrust immunity, courts 
would examine DOC’s relationship with ICANN under the two prongs of 
the state actor test.  
1. Policy Oversight 
Under the first prong of the test, a court would evaluate whether 
ICANN operates according to a “clearly articulated” government policy.206 
The DNS White Paper, the government’s policy proposal that spurred 
ICANN’s creation in 1998, prescribes numerous specific policy directives 
that ICANN, for the most part, has carefully implemented.
207
 However, the 
White Paper is long on policy goals and short on specifics.
208
 A court may 
find that the White Paper is sufficiently ambiguous to fail the “clearly 
articulated” prong of the state actor test. Moreover, the White Paper 
specifically rejected the notion that the new organization it envisioned 
would have antitrust immunity.
209
  
After ICANN was formed, it operated pursuant to a series of 
agreements with DOC.
210
 The original Memorandum of Understanding 
was amended numerous times until the Affirmation of Commitments 
finally replaced it in 2009.
211
 During the operation of the Memorandum of 
Understanding,
212
 ICANN was formally required to submit various 
 
 
 204. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 205. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 206. See California Retail, 445 U.S. at 105. 
 207. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 36–37 (“[T]he White Paper also contained a 
number of policy directions for NewCo, instructions that ICANN has on the whole faithfully 
followed.”). For example, the White Paper specified the need for a mechanism to secure the rights of 
trademark holders, and ICANN quickly developed its much-maligned Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Process, which DOC subsequently praised as being precisely what it had envisioned. Id. at 37–38. 
 208. Id. at 37 (“[T]he White Paper had relatively little to say about the details.”). 
 209. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,747. In response to several 
commenters who suggested that the federal government specifically immunize NewCo from the 
antitrust laws, the White Paper states: “Applicable antitrust law will provide accountability to and 
protection for the international Internet community.” Id. The “clearly articulated” government policy 
seems to be that ICANN should not be exempt from the antitrust laws. Froomkin & Lemley, supra 
note 4, at 37. 
 210. See A. Michael Froomkin, Almost Free: An Analysis of ICANN’s ‘Affirmation of 
Commitments,’ 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 187, 191–94 (2011).  
 211. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 212. Later in its life, the Memorandum of Understanding was rebranded the Joint Project 
Agreement (JPA). See ICANN’s Major Agreements and Related Reports, ICANN.ORG, http://www. 
icann.org/en/general/agreements.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
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progress reports to DOC on a regular basis.
213
 Additionally, DOC 
exercised a great deal of informal control over the direction of DNS 
policy. For example, DOC effectively vetoed the addition of the .xxx 
TLD, a domain for adult websites, even though it had been approved by 
ICANN.
214
 DOC’s hostility to .xxx, and its success at preventing its 
addition to the DNS, illustrates the federal government’s considerable 
residual policy control over ICANN. 
The Affirmation of Commitments altered DOC’s policy oversight of 
ICANN in several important ways. Most significantly, ICANN is no 
longer accountable exclusively to DOC.
215
 Before the Affirmation, 
ICANN’s internal reviews and audits were submitted only to DOC; after 
the Affirmation, those reviews are submitted to “an international 
committee of parties . . . who represent[] 100 countries around the 
world.”216 By signing the Affirmation, ICANN and the United States 
transformed the tone of U.S.-international relations over Internet policy.
217
 
The international community, which had been highly critical of what it 
viewed as the United States’ heavy-handed control over ICANN,218 was 
optimistic at the change.
219
 The Affirmation of Commitments formally 
 
 
 213. Amendment 6 to Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Sept. 16, 2003), http:// 
www.ntia.doc.gov/page/2003/icann-ammendment-6 (requiring ICANN to provide “a status report to 
the Department on its progress towards the completion of its tasks under this Agreement” every six 
months).  
 214. See Scott P. Sonbuchner, Note, Master of Your Domain: Should the U.S. Government 
Maintain Control over the Internet’s Root?, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 183, 199–200 (2008). DOC’s action 
came under heavy criticism. See Steve DelBianco & Braden Cox, ICANN Internet Governance: Is It 
Working?, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 27, 41 (2008) (“[C]ritics complain that the 
U.S. abused its oversight role by overriding a DNS management decision that rightly belongs under 
ICANN’s purview.”). The .xxx TLD has since been fast-tracked to approval after an ICANN 
Independent Review Panel questioned the Board’s denial of the TLD. See ICANN Publishes Draft 
Agreement on .XXX, ICANN.ORG (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/ 
announcement-24aug10-en.htm. 
 215. See Statement of Rod Beckstrom, ICANN CEO, ICANN.ORG (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www. 
icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-30sep09-en.htm (“[I]n the past under the JPA [Joint 
Project Agreement] those reviews [of accountability and transparency] were simply submitted to the 
U.S. government.”). 
 216. Id.  
 217. ICANN’s CEO Rod Beckstrom, in reaction to the agreement, said: “One world, one Internet, 
everyone connected—this is our goal at ICANN. This agreement gives international stakeholders an 
even more powerful voice in our activities moving forward.” Vineetha Menon, United States lets go of 
ICANN, ITP.NET (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.itp.net/577791-united-states-lets-go-of-icann.  
 218. The European Union, among others, had been insisting that ICANN be completely “delinked 
from the U.S. government and made fully independent to allow for a more global participation.” John 
Poirier & Richard Change, US Government signs pact with Internet domain body, REUTERS, Oct. 1, 
2009, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/idINN3021700320090930. 
 219. See US loosens its control over the internet, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 1, 2009), 
http://news.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/us-loosens-its-control-over-the-internet-200910 
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recognized the conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding between 
DOC and ICANN, and professed to usher in a new era for ICANN—
independent of DOC and the U.S. Government.
220
 
Despite the lofty internationalist rhetoric, the Affirmation of 
Commitments does not clearly sever the ties between DOC and ICANN. 
During the months leading up to its signing, several prominent U.S. 
legislators conveyed their belief that the relationship should become a 
permanent one.
221
 ICANN CEO Rod Beckstrom acknowledged that the 
Affirmation created exactly that—a “perpetual agreement” between 
ICANN and the United States.
222
 DOC remains an active participant in 
ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee and it secured a position for 
itself on a committee that will review ICANN’s accountability and 
transparency.
223
  
Although the Affirmation is viewed largely as a step away from U.S. 
control over ICANN and global Internet policy, it remains unclear what 
DOC would do if it strongly disagreed with the direction of ICANN 
policy.
224
 The Affirmation leaves unaffected DOC’s final authority to alter 
the root zone file.
225
 DOC would likely find it politically unfeasible to take 
such action, but in theory it retains the power to add (or, more alarmingly, 
subtract) domain names and even entire TLDs from the root.
226
 Even with 
this ultimate authority, ICANN would likely fail the first prong of the state 
actor test because the government’s policy is not “clearly articulated.” 
 
 
01-gcww.html (“The European Union welcomed what it called ‘a significant positive move towards a 
new and more open ‘working environment’ for ICANN.’”). 
 220. See Affirmation of Commitments, supra note 128, § 2. 
 221. Key Members of Congress Call for Permanent ICANN-US Tie, CIRCLEID (Aug. 5, 2009), 
http://www.circleid.com/posts/key_members_of_congress_call_for_permanent_icann_us_tie/. Commerce 
Secretary Gary Locke received a letter from key members of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, the congressional committee that oversees DOC, urging that the relationship between 
ICANN and the U.S. “be made permanent and strengthened.” Id.  
 222. See Statement of Rod Beckstrom, supra note 215; see also Press Release, Nat’l Telecomms. 
And Info. Admin., Commerce’s NTIA and ICANN Establish a Long-Lasting Framework for the 
Technical Coordination of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (Sept. 30, 2009), 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press/2009/ICANN_Affirmation_090930.html (stating that the 
Affirmation of Commitments “reinforces a long-standing relationship between ICANN and the 
Department of Commerce”).  
 223. See Affirmation of Commitments, supra note 128, § 9.1.  
 224. For example, Congress and DOC have expressed serious reservations about the New gTLD 
Program, citing concerns over the rights of trademark holders. This concern made its way into the 
Affirmation itself. See Affirmation of Commitments, supra note 128, art. 5. 
 225. See Froomkin, supra note 5, at 203–06 (discussing DOC’s residual authority over the root 
zone file itself, which is maintained pursuant to a separate contract with VeriSign). 
 226. See id. at 204 (“[B]efore the Affirmation, if ICANN wanted to add, change, or remove a 
TLD, it needed DOC’s permission, or at least acquiescence. Nothing in the Affirmation changes that 
. . . .”). 
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However, the combination of formal and informal controls retained by 
DOC does nothing but complicate that analysis and confound the test’s 
application. 
2. Active Supervision: The IANA Contract 
Under the second prong of the state actor test, a court would evaluate 
whether ICANN is “actively supervised” by the federal government.227 
While uncertainty persists as to DOC’s oversight of ICANN’s policy 
decisions, there is little doubt as to DOC’s ultimate control over whether 
ICANN continues to be the administrator of the DNS. Pursuant to a 
contract with DOC, ICANN “maintain[s] the continuity and stability of 
services related to certain interdependent Internet technical management 
functions, known collectively as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA).”228 The IANA function consists of the technical and 
administrative work of operating the DNS, including management of the 
root zone file and the allocation of IP addresses.
229
  
The IANA function is distinct from ICANN’s broader policy-making 
responsibilities, but ICANN’s ability to make DNS policy essentially 
derives from its control over the IANA function and the nuts and bolts of 
Internet naming and addressing.
230
 DOC’s contract with ICANN for the 
performance of the IANA function gives DOC significant input into 
ICANN’s technical decisions.231 Whether a court determines that DOC 
“actively supervises” ICANN for purposes of the state actor test depends 
on whether that court finds that DOC’s control over the IANA function 
gives it parallel control over ICANN’s policy-making functions. 
The IANA contract permits DOC to inspect “premises, systems, and 
processes,”232 requires ICANN to submit monthly performance progress 
reports,
233
 prohibits ICANN from changing its methods for performing the 
 
 
 227. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
 228. ICANN/U.S. Government Contract for Performance of the IANA Function, ICANN.ORG, 
§ C.1.1 (Aug. 14, 2006), http://www.icann.org/general/iana-contract-14aug06.pdf. 
 229. Id. § C.2.2.1.2-3. 
 230. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, supra note 19, § III.B. The original Memorandum of 
Understanding sets out ICANN’s four primary purposes. Only one of those involves policy 
development while the other three are purely technical. ICANN’s policy-development role is 
intimately bound up with its role as technical administrator of the DNS. Id. 
 231. See infra notes 232–38 and accompanying text. 
 232. ICANN/U.S. Government Contract for Performance of the IANA Function, supra note 228, 
§ C.2.1. 
 233. Id. § C.3.1. 
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IANA function without prior DOC approval,
234
 and permits DOC to 
terminate the agreement at its convenience.
235
 The Affirmation of 
Commitments left the IANA contract completely untouched.
236
 Although 
the United States has never indicated any willingness to grant the IANA 
contract to another organization, the mere fact that it could, if it wanted, 
overshadows ICANN’s mandate and authority.237 DOC’s continued 
control over the IANA function gives the United States a huge amount of 
power—the power to literally “turn off” the Internet for a given TLD.238 
The IANA contract, with its unambiguously favorable terms for DOC, 
suggests a great deal of active supervision of ICANN’s technical and 
administrative functions. 
Although the IANA contract gives DOC a great deal of power over 
ICANN and the DNS, a court is nevertheless unlikely to find that DOC 
actively supervises ICANN in a manner that would satisfy the second 
prong of the state actor test.
239
 There is no evidence that DOC has used its 
significant technical oversight of ICANN to achieve parallel oversight of 
ICANN’s policy-making.240 The Supreme Court requires that the State be 
intimately involved in crafting the details of economic policy to find that a 
private actor is entitled to antitrust immunity.
241
 While ICANN could 
demonstrate DOC’s intimate involvement with its performance of the 
IANA function,
242
 it likely could not show a concomitant involvement 
 
 
 234. Id. § C.4.2. 
 235. Id. § I.1. 
 236. Froomkin, supra note 5, at 206 (“The IANA agreement is unaffected by the Affirmation.”); 
see also Grant Gross, ICANN freed from US gov’t oversight, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS220287397120090930.  
 237. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 157 (observing that the termination provision in the old Joint 
Project Agreement, similar to the one in the IANA contract, “most clearly reflects the U.S. 
government’s assertion of regulatory power over the DNS, and, through it, the Internet.”). 
 238. See id. at 159; see also Sonbuchner, supra note 214, at 203 (observing that some of the 
harshest critics of ICANN are “countries with poor relationships with the United States” who could 
theoretically see their online presence altered or deleted by an overzealous Commerce Department). 
 239. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 38 (“[ICANN’s] chances of prevailing on the 
‘active supervision’ requirement look slim.”).  
 240. This assumes that DOC’s policy oversight authority discussed in Part III.B.1, supra, is not 
sufficient, by itself, to satisfy the “active supervision” prong of the state actor test. See Froomkin & 
Lemley, supra note 4, at 36 (“[ICANN] would have a very hard time showing the necessary degree of 
active government supervision and involvement in its implementation of that policy.”). 
 241. F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634–35 (1992) (finding that the purpose of the 
active supervision inquiry “is to determine whether the State has exercised sufficient independent 
judgment and control so that the details of the rates or prices have been established as a product of 
deliberate state intervention”). 
 242. See supra notes 232–38 and accompanying text. 
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with its policy-making function.
243
 This is especially true since the signing 
of the Affirmation of Commitments, under which both DOC and ICANN 
profess to operate independently of one another.
244
  
The actual relationship between ICANN and DOC remains uncertain, 
particularly after the signing of the Affirmation of Commitments.
245
 While 
ICANN’s public statements suggest that the United States exercises little 
control over its decisions,
246
 no court has ever examined the issue. Because 
of the significant role retained by DOC even under the Affirmation of 
Commitments, and DOC’s substantial control over ICANN through the 
IANA contract, ICANN could plausibly demonstrate that it deserves 
antitrust immunity.
247
 More likely, however, is that ICANN is sufficiently 
independent from the federal government to preclude any such 
immunity.
248
 This uncertainty will only be resolved if ICANN’s conduct is 
subjected to antitrust scrutiny. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the difficulties in applying antitrust law to ICANN, courts and 
antitrust enforcement authorities should more closely scrutinize its activity 
to preserve and promote competition in the domain name marketplace. 
ICANN has potentially harmed competition by conspiring with its registry 
operators to eliminate competitive bidding; by setting maximum prices for 
domain name registrations in the .com, .net, and .org TLDs; and by 
limiting the introduction of new TLDs. As a result of ICANN’s 
anticompetitive conduct, consumers pay more for domain name 
 
 
 243. See supra Part III.B.1. Although a combination of formal and informal controls over 
ICANN’s policy-making process gives DOC more authority over ICANN than any other outside 
entity, it is likely insufficient to meet the strict requirements of the “active supervision” prong of the 
Supreme Court’s test. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 38–39 (describing the loose control 
exercised by DOC and the public statements of the two organizations professing their independence 
from each other). 
 244. See, e.g., The Affirmation of Commitments—What it Means, ICANN.ORG (Sept. 30, 2009), 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-30sep09-en.htm (“[The Affirmation] declares 
ICANN is independent and is not controlled by any one entity.”). 
 245. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 163 (observing the “uncertainty about the nature and legitimacy 
of a post-JPA ICANN”). 
 246. See The Affirmation of Commitments—What it Means, supra note 244. 
 247. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 4, at 36 (“[I]t is always possible that ICANN would be 
able to demonstrate that the government has had a far greater behind-the-scenes involvement in 
ICANN’s decision than either the DOC or ICANN has admitted.”). 
 248. In a recent article, Professor Froomkin expressed the opinion that ICANN would almost 
certainly not be considered a state actor. “ICANN’s growing independence from the U.S.—even if it is 
not yet complete—weakens, I think fatally, the case for labeling ICANN a state actor under U.S. law 
in the future.” Froomkin, supra note 5, at 208. 
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registrations than they otherwise would, and innovation is discouraged. 
The antitrust laws were designed to remedy exactly these problems. Courts 
should look past ICANN’s maze-like organizational structure and its 
complicated relationship with the U.S. government and examine its 
conduct like any other private entity. If scrutinized properly, ICANN will 
be more likely to effectively promote competition in the domain name 
market—an objective it shares with the antitrust laws.  
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